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Abstract
A three-level nested logit model for the choice of residential loca-
tion, workplace, and type of employment is used to assess the effect
of an individual-specific measure of accessibility to employments that
takes into account the attractiveness of different occupations when the
choice of workplace is anticipated in the decision of residential location.
The model allows for variation in the preferences for types of employ-
ment across individuals and accounts for individual heterogeneity of
preferences at each choice level in education, age, gender, and children.
Using data from the Île-de-France region, it shows that the individual-
specific accessibility measure is an important determinant of the choice
of residential location and its effect differs along the life cycle. The
attractiveness of the types of employment is a better predictor of the
workplace location than the usual total number of employments.
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1 Introduction
Choice models of location have been estimated conditional either on work-
place or on residential location. The first discrete choice models applied to
residential location (Lerman, 1976; McFadden, 1978; Anas, 1981) borrowed
the assumption of the exogenous determination of workplace location from
the monocentric models (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1972). Siegel (1975)
and Simpson (1980) extended the monocentric model allowing a simultaneous
choice of workplace and residential location and Linneman et al. (1983) used
the joint multinomial logit model for residential migration and job search.
The assumption of exogenous workplace in choice models of residential
location has been questioned since the empirical results of Waddell (1993),
who showed that a joint logit model of workplace, tenure, and residential lo-
cation outperform a nested logit model for the choice of tenure and residential
location, conditional on workplace.
On the one hand, residential location choice models have been studied in
connection with mobility or relocation (Clark et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2010),
mode choice (Eliasson et al., 2000), and accessibility (Ben-Akiva et al., 1998).
On the other hand, choice models of workplace location have been mostly
developed in the framework of aggregated travel models.
Discrete choice models of both residential location and workplace have
also been addressed from the point of view of the multi-worker household.
Freedman et al. (1997) and Abraham et al. (1997) studied the influence of
spouses’ earnings and commuting time on the choice of the household resi-
dential location and the spouses’ workplaces to study how the employment
opportunities for the wife influence the choice of workplace of both spouses
and the household residential location. Waddell et al. (2007) adapted methods
of market segmentation in a discrete choice model of joint residential location
and workplace for single-worker households to model the probability of choos-
ing residential location or workplace first. Doing so, no a priori assumption
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is necessary on the exogenous choice (workplace and residential location can
be chosen in any order) and the probability of making one choice before the
other depends on household characteristics.
Crane (1996) and Kan (1999; 2002) deal with the effect of changes in the
type of employment on residential mobility, mobility expectation, and com-
muting behavior. Palma et al. (2008) review the implications of risk and
uncertainty in the framework of discrete choice models in residential loca-
tion and transportation. Cohen (2013) provides in this issue an introduction
to decision-making under risk and uncertainty in the (non-)expected utility
framework. Ben-Akiva et al. (2012) review processes and contexts in discrete
choice models.
Commuting time is one of the main determinants of residential location. It
depends on both household location and workplace, which themselves result
from a two-stage decision process. The second-stage decision is conditioned on
the first stage, and the second stage is anticipated in the first stage. Workers
choose a workplace conditional on their actual residential location (second
stage), and anticipate their potential workplaces (employment opportunities),
when choosing their residential location (first stage). Actual commuting time
explains the choice of workplace location (Abraham et al., 1997; Levine, 1998),
while accessibility to employments explains the choice of residential location
(Anas, 1981; Ben-Akiva et al., 1998; Levinson, 1998).
Which decision, workplace or residential location, is made first is an open
question. Does workplace influence residential location or conversely? This
dependency is affected by the the household’s life cycle, by the rigidities in the
real estate and labor markets, by the availability of employments, and by the
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households (Waddell, 1993;
Waddell et al., 2007). Discrete choice models (Ben-Akiva et al., 1985; Anderson
et al., 1992) allow us to study the interdependency in the choices of location
(nested models). They let the choice of residence (and of workplace) appear
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as a trade-off between local characteristics varying across socio-demographic
segments (Sermons et al., 2001; Bhat et al., 2004).
We develop a three-level nested logit model of the interdependency of resi-
dential location and workplace, accounting for the variation across individuals
in the preferences for types of employment. Residential location is the highest
level choice; workplace location is the intermediate level choice; and the type
of employment is the lowest level. This nested structure allows us to build an
individual-specific accessibility measure, which corresponds to the expected
maximum utility across all potential workplace locations. When considering
accessibility to employments, the choice of a particular workplace is influenced
by the distribution of employments of the same type of the worker. This three-
level nested logit configuration also allows us to build an individual-specific
measure of attractiveness to types of employment.
2 Risk and information in discrete choice models
Each household chooses a single alternative from the choice set L, with ∣L∣ = L.
The set L0 of possible alternatives is partitioned into I choice sets Li, i =
1, ..., I, also called nests. Li represents the nest containing a given alternative
i, i ∈ L0. The list of nests is assumed to be exogenous and identical for all
decision makers. The utility of individual n choosing alternative i is a random
variable given by Un (i) = Vn (i)+εn (i), where Vn (i) is the deterministic utility,
and where εn (i) is an absolutely continuous random variable. The random
term εn (i) is an error term unknown to the modeler, covering the unobservable
individual or unknown characteristics (Manski et al., 1977). Such models are
also referred to as additive random utility models (McFadden, 1978; Anderson
et al., 1992). Alternatively, the error term εn (i) can be interpreted as a match
value between the individual n and the alternative i. The modeler is assumed
to know the distribution of the error terms, but not their specific values.
In the cases analyzed below, we make different assumptions about the level
4
of information available to the decision maker at the different stages of the
decision process (before or after the individual chooses a set of alternatives).
The expected value of εn (i) is set to zero without loss of generality, and its
standard deviation is assumed to be the same across alternatives and denoted
by µ. According to the law of comparative judgments (Thurstone, 1927), the
decision maker knowing the realization of εn (i) , i ∈ L, selects the alternative
with the highest utility. Formally, the probability that the individual n selects
the alternative i in the choice set L is:
Pn (i∣L) = Pr (Un (i) ⩾ Un (i′) , ∀ i′ ∈ L) . (1)
We shall extend this formula to the case where the decision maker ignores the
realization of εn (i). In the MNL model, the error terms are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Their common law is Gumbel
or double exponential distributed, with:
P (ε ≤ x) = exp(− exp(− (x + γ)
µ
)) , (2)
where the shift parameter γ ≃ 0.5772 is the Euler constant. It guarantees that
E (ε) = 0. The standard deviation of ε is proportional to the scale parameter µ.
The CDF of a standard Gumbel distribution is P (ε ≤ x) = exp (− exp (−x)); its
expectation is γ and its standard deviation is pi√
6
(this corresponds to µ = 1).
The PDF of this standard random variable is denoted by f and given by
f (x) = exp (−x) exp (− exp (−x)) .
When the error terms are i.i.d. Gumbel with scale parameter µ, the choice
probabilities have the closed form (McFadden, 1978):
Pn (i∣L) = exp(
Vn (i)
µ
)
∑
i′∈L exp (Vn(i′)µ ) , i ∈ L. (3)
The same expression holds for any shift parameter other than γ or 0.
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Consider two alternatives i1 and i2 included in two choice sets L1 and L2.
The property
Pn (i1∣L1)
Pn (i2∣L1) =
exp(Vn (i1)
µ
)
∑
i′∈L exp(Vn (i′)µ )
exp(Vn (i2)
µ
)
∑
i′∈L exp(Vn (i′)µ )
= exp(Vn (i1)µ )
exp(Vn (i2)
µ
)
=
exp(Vn (i1)
µ
)
∑
i′′∈L′ exp(Vn (i′′)µ )
exp(Vn (i2)
µ
)
∑
i′′∈L′ exp(Vn (i′′)µ )
(4)
= Pn (i1∣L2)
Pn (i2∣L2)
corresponds to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which char-
acterizes the multinomial logit model. The relative probability that the indi-
vidual n selects the alternative i1 rather than the alternative i2 is the same in
all the choice sets containing both i1 and i2.
An individual who chooses between different choice sets needs to evaluate
the benefit (or surplus) of the different choice sets beforehand, before the
choice is made based on the information available at that stage.
The terminology ex-ante and ex-post characterizes the level of information
available to the decision maker. The ex-ante utility of the choice set L corre-
sponds to the value associated to L before selection. The ex-post utility of the
choice set L corresponds to the value associated to L after selection, based on
the information available at that stage. We present the different cases.
6
2.1 Information revealed ex-post
This case is the learning case. The individual has no information ex-ante
about the exact value of the individual terms, but acquires such information
after selecting the choice set.
After selecting the choice set, the individual becomes acquainted with the
individual terms and observes the realizations en ≡ (e1, ..., eL) of the random
terms εn (1) , .., εn (L). Once the choice set L is selected, the utility of alter-
native i is a number denoted by U˜n (i) = Vn (i) + ei, i = 1, ..., L. The ex-post
value of the utility of the choice set L is a number equal to:
U˜n (L; en) = max
i∈L U˜n (i) . (5)
Ex-ante, the values of the error terms are unknown, but the probability
distribution of εn (1) , ..., εn (L), evaluated at any point en, is known and given
by f (e1) , f (e2) , ....f (eL). The surplus of the choice set L corresponds to
its expected utility, computed ex-ante:
EUn (L) ≡ ∫
RL
U˜n (L;en) f (e1) f (e2) ....f (eL)de1de2...deL. (6)
Eq. (6) is in the vein of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility func-
tion, involving the computation of L integrals.
With the Gumbel specification, the ex-ante utility of the choice set L is a
surplus corresponding to the expected utility of the choice set L (Ben-Akiva
et al., 1985):
Sn (L) ≡ EUn (L) = µ ln(∑
i∈L exp(Vn (i)µ )) . (7)
If, without loss of generality, Vn (1) < ... < Vn (i) < ...Vn (L), then,
lim
µ→0 EUn (L) = Vn (L) . (8)
When the individual terms vanish, the model becomes deterministic. In this
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case, the individual n selects the best alternative L with probability 1 and
obtains the utility Vn (L).
Moreover, as the variance of the individual terms is very large, each MNL
choice probability tends to 1/L and the expected utility of the chosen alter-
native tends to infinity:
lim
µ→∞EUn (L) =∞. (9)
This is because the maximum of i.i.d. Gumbels has a Gumbel distribution
with the same variance (here µ which tends to infinity) and with the same
expected value (here tending to infinity).
As expected, the attractiveness of a choice set increases with additional
alternatives.
If Vn (1) = .... = Vn (i) = ... = Vn (L) ≡ Vn,
EUn (L) = Vn + µ ln (L) , (10)
so that the marginal contribution of an extra alternative decreases when the
total number of alternatives increases. The expected utility is an increasing
and concave function of the total number of alternatives L.
2.2 Information available ex-ante
This is the full-information case. The decision maker knows the value of the
individual terms beforehand. Therefore the ex-ante value of the utility of the
choice set is the same as its ex-post value. This common value is equal to:
U˜n (L; en) = max
i∈L U˜n (i) . (11)
This common value is also equal to the ex-post value of the choice set in
Eq. (11), when information is revealed only ex-post. By contrast, the ex-ante
value of the choice set depends on whether the decision maker has the piece of
information ex-ante. Ex-ante information has a strictly positive value because
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it helps the decision maker to select the choice set, a fact presented in Table
1.
[Insert Table 1]
Consider two choice sets containing two alternatives each. The expected utility
Vi, i = 1, ...,4 is equal to 0 for the two alternatives of the first choice set, and
is equal to 1 for the two alternatives of the second choice set. The realizations
ei, i = 1, ...,4 of the random terms are (2,1) for the first choice set and (0,−1)
for the second one. The utilities Ui, i = 1, ...,4 are then (2,1) in the first
choice set and (1,0) in the second choice set. In the absence of information
ex-ante, the decision maker ignores the realizations ei of the random variables.
Therefore, these realizations are i.i.d. across alternatives, the decision maker
selects the second choice set (with the highest expected utility Vi) at the first
stage of the choice process. Once this choice set is selected, the decision maker
observes the realizations in this choice set, and selects the third alternative
(because it has the highest utility Ui in the chosen choice set).
By contrast, with information obtained ex-ante, the decision maker selects
the first choice set and the first alternative. The decision maker acts as in
a one-step choice process, as in a selection among the full set of alternatives
(alternative 1).
In the learning case, the choice set selected ex-ante often differs (as in the
example above) from the choice set, which is the best ex-post in the second
step. The decision maker selects the alternative that is the best ex-post in the
small choice set selected in the first step, but the alternative finally selected
is usually not optimal ex-post in the full choice set. This implies that, in the
learning case, a suboptimal alternative is selected when the alternative, which
is optimal ex-post, is not included in the choice subset that is optimal ex-ante.
The individual-specific value of the choice set in the full information case
holds for the decision maker n, characterized by the realization en ≡ (e1, ..., eL) .
The decision maker knows this value ex-ante, but the modeler knows it neither
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ex-ante nor ex-post. The modeler ignores the realizations of individual error
terms for a given individual, but knows the probability f (e1) f (e2) ...f (eL)
de1de2...deL with which the individual terms lie in the infinitesimal hypercube
d (en) ≡ de1de2...deL. The expected utility of the choice set L for the individ-
ual n, computed by the modeler who ignores the value of the individual taste,
is:
∫
RL
U˜n (L; en) f (e1) f (e2) ....f (eL)de1de2...deL. (12)
The probability, computed by the modeler, that the individual n chooses the
alternative i in the choice set L corresponds to the probability that the vector
en lies in the region {Vn (i) + en (i) > Vn (i′) + en (i′) ; ∀i′ ∈ L}. It is given by
the MNL formula in Eq. (3). This formula holds when the decision maker
chooses among the full set L0 or among a subset Li.
The modeler knows that the decision maker, having access to the informa-
tion ex-ante, will select the same choice set and the same alternative as in a
situation of selecting among the full set of alternatives; that is, if the decision
maker were choosing in a single step. Consequently, when the decision maker
has access to the information ex-ante, the choice probabilities computed by
the modeler are the same as if the decision maker were choosing in a single
step.
2.3 No information, neither ex-ante nor ex-post
In this no-information case, the decision maker knows the distributions of
the individual terms, but ignores the realizations of these terms both before
and after selecting the choice set. As the decision maker acquires no new
information after selecting the choice set, the decision process amounts to a
one-step procedure.
The no-information case can also be interpreted as a situation where the
choice of the decision maker is the outcome of an embedded matching model.
In this case, the decision maker devotes some effort to determine an opti-
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mal quality of matching. This quality determines the matching probabilities,
defined as the probability that a given alternative is chosen by the decision
maker. The necessary effort corresponds to minimizing the risk of unsatisfac-
tory matching. The procedure yields the MNL probabilities:
Pn (i∣L) = exp (Vn(i)µ )∑
i′∈L exp (Vn(i′)µ ) , i ∈ L. (13)
Eq. (13) holds when the decision maker chooses among the full set (L = L0)
or among a nest (L = Li).
The probability that the decision maker is allocated to the nest Li is the
sum of the probabilities associated to each alternative in the nest Li ∶
Pn (Li∣L0) = ∑i′′∈Li exp (
Vn(i′′)
µ )
∑
i′∈L0 exp (Vn(i′)µ )
,Li ⊂ L0. (14)
From Eq. (14), Pn (i∣L0) = Pn (i∣Li)Pn (Li∣L0): the probability that a decision
maker choosing in two stages is allocated to a given alternative is the same
as if the decision maker were choosing in a single step. The modeler, who
has access to the same information as the decision maker, computes the same
probability.
The case involving ex-ante information and no information ex-post is in-
consistent because ex-ante information is included in ex-post information.
2.4 One-step versus two-step decision process: MNL ver-
sus nested logit
To sum up, the decision is achieved in one step when information is the same
ex-ante and ex-post, and in two steps when information is acquired ex-post
(learning case). This latter case applies when alternatives are so many that
the decision maker, unable to acquire information on all alternatives, selects
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a choice set in the first step from the ex-ante value of this choice set. In the
second step, the decision maker acquires information about the alternatives
contained in the choice set selected ex-ante in the first step (but not about
alternatives included in other choice sets).
In the full-information case, the choice is deterministic for the decision
maker, but probabilistic and given by the MNL in Eq. (3) for the modeler,
who ignores the value of the individual terms.
In the no-information case, the choice is random both for the decision
maker and for the modeler, and the choice probabilities are given by the same
MNL in Eq. (3).
The fact that the modeler computes the same probability in the full-
information and in the no-information cases implies that it is not possible
to test one model against the other. The data contains no information that
can be used to test whether the decision maker has full or no information.
On the contrary, the probability computed by the modeler is different in
the learning case because the modeler knows that the decision maker will
acquire information ex-post, even though the modeler acquires no information
ex-post. In the learning case, the decision maker in the first step will certainly
select the choice set that is the best ex-ante, maximizing the surplus computed
as in Eq. (7). For the subset Li′ , the surplus is:
Sn (Li′) ≡ EUn (Li′) = µ1 ln⎛⎝ ∑i′′∈Li′ exp(Vn (i
′′)
µ1
)⎞⎠ , (15)
where µ1 is proportional to the standard deviation of the individual terms
within Li′ .
The decision maker’s preferences are assumed to reflect her perception of
the quality of the subset. The corresponding individual terms are assumed to
be i.i.d. Gumbel distributed with zero mean and standard deviation propor-
tional to µ2. Using the same reasoning as before, the probability computed
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by the modeler that the decision maker selects the subset Li, i = 1, ..., I is:
Pn (Li) = exp(
Sn (Li)
µ2
)
I∑
i′=1 exp(Sn (Li′)µ2 )
, i = 1, ..., I. (16)
When µ1 = µ2, the NL probabilities boil down to the MNL probabilities. The
test of the equality µ1 = µ2 amounts to testing that there is no acquisition of
information from the first to the second decision stage.
We now consider a multi-level nested model, in which individuals decide
upon their residential location, workplace, and type of employment, and may
acquire information at each choice step. Each level in this nested model is
described by a MNL model, so the full model is a multi-level NL model with
different scale parameters, and a MNL model with equal scale parameters
when no information is available.
3 Data
The model is estimated using exhaustive household data from the 1999 French
census in the Île-de-France region. Type of employment and individual char-
acteristics are observed for 100% of the population, corresponding to about
11 million inhabitants regrouped in 5 million households. Residential loca-
tion and workplace are observed at the commune (municipality) level for a
5% sample of the working population, around 240,000 workers in 1999. The
commune is the smallest administrative unit used in France. The Paris re-
gion is composed of 1,300 communes, of which 20 form the city of Paris. The
1,300 communes are grouped into eight départements. The city of Paris counts
about 2 million inhabitants. The inner ring (close suburbs) is made up of three
départements, while the outer ring is composed of four départements (Figure
2).
[Insert Figure 2]
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The area shows spatial disparities in the supply of employments. In partic-
ular, many outer ring communes have little or no employment supply. Almost
25% of the 1,300 communes (almost entirely located in the outer ring) are
very small communes in terms of number of employments (Figure 3). In or-
der to circumvent this problem, small adjacent communes were grouped into
“pseudo-communes” following a simple pairwise aggregation (Babcock, 2010)
until each pseudo-commune contained at least 100 employments. The result-
ing 950 pseudo-communes with 100 employments or more were used as units
of location for both employments and residence.
[Insert Figure 3]
The census data was aggregated at the pseudo-commune level, and vari-
ables measuring prices and local amenities were computed at the same level.
Price data come from the Cote Callon annual real estate market price assess-
ment (La cote annuelle des valeurs vénales immobilières et foncières 1999),
which reports average prices per m2 for offices and dwellings by type and
tenure status for communes with more than 5,000 inhabitants (287 com-
munes, each of them containing at least 100 employments). We estimated
hedonic price regressions jointly for each tenure and dwelling type as well as
for offices, and used the results to predict prices in smaller pseudo-communes.
Palma et al. (2007) describe local amenities, price equations, and the method
used for correcting the endogeneity of prices.
We estimated origin-destination (O-D) matrices of travel time for pub-
lic transportation from the Regional department of infrastructure and trans-
portation planning (DRIEA) transport model MODUS. We computed O-D
matrices of travel time for private cars using the dynamic transport network
model METROPOLIS described in Palma et al. (1997). The transport model
METROPOLIS has a dynamic traffic simulator where vehicles are simulated
individually and traffic dynamics are modeled at the aggregate level. The
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disaggregate representation of demand allows us to consider the heterogene-
ity of the population and trips. Saifuzzaman et al. (2012) provide detailed
information on the calibration of METROPOLIS for the Paris region.
The sample contains 239,499 people living and working in Île-de-France.
We estimated the lowest and intermediate level models (choice of type of em-
ployment and of workplace) separately in 24 subsamples in order to reflect how
individual preferences and employment opportunities depend on age, educa-
tion, sex, and fertility. The sample is split in two age groups of approximately
equal size, those under 35 and those over 35. We defined education groups
(elementary, secondary, undergraduate, and graduate) according to prelimi-
nary results measuring the influence of education on the choice of the type of
employment. Similarly, we measured the influence of fertility on the choice of
the type of employment of women by a dummy variable indicating whether or
not a woman has at least one child under 12. The combination of education,
age, sex, and fertility categories yields 24 categories (Table 2).
[Insert Table 2]
4 A nested logit model for type of employment, work-
place, and residential location
The individual n chooses a residential location i, a workplace j, and a specific
employment l of type k in a set denoted by En. There are I locations and K
types of employment. Individual utility, denoted by Un, is:
Un (l, k, j, i) = UTn (l, k)+UWn (j)−CWRn (j, i)+URn (i) ∀ (l, k, j, i) ∈ En, (17)
where UTn (l, k) denotes the utility specific to employment l of type k, UWn (j)
the utility specific to the workplace j, and URn (i) the utility of living in res-
idential location i. The term CWRn (j, i) captures the total commuting cost
between residential location i and workplace j.
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The model is focused on the selection of a specific employment, including
its type and location, and on the choice of a residential location. We solve
a three-stage model by backward induction (Figure 1). At the lowest level,
the individual n chooses a specific employment l of type k, conditional on
workplace j and residential location i. At the intermediate level, the individual
n chooses a workplace j, conditional on residential location i and anticipating
an employment l of type k. At the highest level, the individual n chooses a
residential location i, anticipating the work-related choices (j, k, l).
[Insert Figure 1]
We impose additive separability between the deterministic and stochastic
components of the utility at each level. The utility UTn (l, k) provided by the
employment l of type k, in Eq. (17), is decomposed into a deterministic term
V Tn (k) depending on type k, a random term ε0n (l) depending on the employ-
ment l, and a random term ε1n (k) depending on type k. The deterministic
term V Tn (k) represents the preferences of individual n for employment type k.
A deterministic term specific to the utility of performing a specific employment
l would be added if employment characteristics could be observed. This would
add a level to the tree. Under full information, the preference of individual n
is represented by the random term ε0n (l) for the specific employment l, and by
the random term ε1n (k) for the employment type k. In the no-information and
learning cases, these random terms rather represent employment-specific and
type-specific characteristics unknown by the decision maker before choosing
the workplace and the employment type. In the learning case, after selecting
the employment type k, the decision maker acquires information about the
realization of ε0n (l) for all employments of type l located in j.
V Wn (j) measures the intrinsic preference for working in j and V Rn (i) the
intrinsic preference for living in i. Both are deterministic. The choices of res-
idential location and workplace are related to one another through the total
commuting cost CWRn (j, i). Under full information, the random terms ε2n (j)
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and ε3n (i) correspond to the preference (leading to the unobserved heterogene-
ity of preferences) of individual n for working in j and living in i. An additional
random term representing the total commuting cost would be impossible to
disentangle from ε2n (j). That is why ε2n (j) also includes the preference for
commuting between i and j. In the no information case, ε2n (j) and ε3n (i)
represent local characteristics remaining unknown by the decision maker. In
the learning case, ε2n (j) and ε3n (i) also represent local characteristics available
to the decision maker. The decision maker observes ε3n (i) at the first stage,
but acquires information about ε2n (j) only after selecting residential location
i (which is plausible for commuting costs).
The random terms ειn (⋅) , ι = i, j, k, l, are independent for a given individual
n and independent across individuals.
Utility Un (l, k, j, i) is decomposed as:
Un (l, k, j, i) =V Tn (k) + ε0n (l) + ε1n (k) + V Wn (j) −CWRn (j, i) + ε2n (j)
+V Rn (i) + ε3n (i) ; ∀ (l, k, j, i) ∈ En. (18)
4.1 Lowest level choice: specific employment and type
of employment
The additive separability assumed in Eq. (18) means that the preference of
individual n for a specific employment l of type k is independent from the
employment location. This preference may be related, for example, to wages,
or to the total number of working hours. These characteristics vary across
employment types, depending on individual characteristics such as sex, edu-
cation, or age. This is the reason why V Tn (k), ε0n (l), and ε1n (k) are indexed
by n. We assume that the difference between the utilities of two employ-
ment types for a given individual is independent of location. For this reason
V Tn (k) + ε0n (l) + ε1n (k) does not depend on employment and residential loca-
tions i and j. This does not exclude that employment characteristics vary
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geographically. For example, wages may be systematically higher in a loca-
tion j than in a location j′. These geographical differences, if any, can be
included in V Wn (j) + ε2n (j), provided they are the same across types of em-
ployment. We exclude the case where geographical differences are specific to
a type of employment, for example, where wages are systematically higher in
j then in j′ for blue collar jobs, but identical in j and j′ for white collar jobs.
This interpretation in the full-information case, also applies in the learning
and no information cases. As a result, the choice between the various employ-
ments located in j only depends on individual characteristics and employment
types, and is not affected by local observed or unobserved characteristics of
workplace or residential location.Tkj denotes the set of employments of type k available to an individual n
in location j, with ∣Tkj ∣ = Nkj. Because the deterministic part of the utility
V Tn (k) depends only on employment type k, but not on the specific employ-
ment l, all the employments in Tkj have the same probability 1/Nkj to be
selected, and Eq. (10) implies that the expected value of employment type k
in location j is
EUn (Tkj) = V Tn (k) + µ0 log (Nkj) , (19)
where µ0 denotes the scaling factor of ε0n (l).
The probability that individual n chooses employment type k given work-
place j is then equal to
P1n (k) = exp(
V Tn (k) + µ0 ln (Nkj)
µ1
)
∑
k′=1,...,K;Nk′j>0 exp(V
T
n (k′) + µ0 ln (Nk′j)
µ1
) , ∀ k = 1, ...,K;Nkj > 0,
(20)
where µ1 denotes the scaling factor of max
l∈T ε0n (l) + ε1n (k), which is assumed
to follow a Gumbel distribution in the learning case. The ratio µ
0
µ1 then cor-
responds to the ratio of the standard error of individual preferences at the
employment-specific level and at the employment-type level, that is the rel-
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ative intensity of unobserved preferences between employments of the same
type and between types of employment.
In the two other cases (full-information and no-information), µ0 = µ1, and
the coefficient of ln (Nkj) simplifies to 1. Indeed, when the decision maker
acquires no information after choosing her nest (here type of employment),
her choice probabilities are the same as if she were choosing in one step in the
full choice set, and given by the MNL formula. In this case, the probability
of specific employment l is given by
P0n (l, k) = exp(
V Tn (k)
µ1
)
∑
k′=1,...,K,Nk′j>0
⎛⎝ ∑l∈Tk′j exp(V
T
n (k′)
µ1
)⎞⎠
, (21)
and the choice probability of employment type k given workplace j is equal
to
P1n (k) = ∑
l∈Tk′j
exp(V Tn (k)
µ1
)
∑
k′=1,...,K,Nk′j>0
⎛⎝ ∑l∈Tk′j exp(V
T
n (k′)
µ1
)⎞⎠
= Nkj exp(V
T
n (k)
µ1
)
∑
k′=1,...,K,Nk′j>0(Nk′j exp(V
T
n (k′)
µ1
))
= exp(
V Tn (k) + µ1 ln (Nkj)
µ1
)
∑
k′=1,...,K,Nk′j>0(exp(V
T
n (k′) + µ1 ln (Nk′j)
µ1
)) . (22)
Allowing µ0/µ1 to vary across individual types (denoted by µ0n/µ1n) amounts
to considering that the relative intensity of unobserved preferences between
employments of the same type and between types of employment varies across
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individuals. The probability in Eq. (22) becomes:
P1n (k) = exp (δ1n + δ0n ln (Nkj))∑
k′=1,...,K,Nk′j>0 exp (δ1n + δ0n ln (Nk′j)) , (23)
with δ0n = µ0nµ1n and δ1n = V Tn (k)µ1n .
The choices of employment type k and employment location j are related
only through the number Nkj of employments of type k in location j, denoted
by Nkj. This comes from the assumption of additive separability in the utility
function of Eq. (18).
In the case of the choice of type of employment conditional on workplace,
the surplus in Eq. (15), which is the expected utility resulting from the choice
of the best type of employment conditional on workplace j, is denoted by
Sn (j), and equal to:
Sn (j) =µ1n ln⎛⎝ K∑k=1,...,K;Nkj>0 exp(V
T
n (k) + µ0 ln (Nkj)
µ1
)⎞⎠
=µ1n ln⎛⎝ K∑k=1,...,K;Nkj>0 exp (δ1n + δ0n ln (Nkj))⎞⎠ . (24)
It measures the attractiveness of workplace j.
4.2 Intermediate level choice: workplace location
I denotes the set of all potential (residential or workplace) locations, with∣I ∣ = I. These locations are assumed to be available for each individual both
for working and for living, so (i, j) ∈ I2. With the decision tree assumed here,
an individual n chooses a workplace j conditional on her current residential
location i. Actual travel time is relevant for explaining workplace location
through the generalized travel cost CWRn (j, i).
From Eq. (17), the utility of workplace location j, including generalized
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commuting cost CWRn (j, i) , between residential location i and workplace j, is:
UWn (j) −CWRn (j, i) = V Wn (j) −CWRn (j, i) + ε2n (j) ∀ j ∈ I. (25)
Similarly to the lowest level in the full information case, the error term
ε2n (j) representing the unobserved heterogeneity preference of individual n
assignable to workplace j is distributed in such a way that the random part
of max(k,l) UTn (l, k) + ε2n (j) has a Gumbel distribution with scale parameter µ2n
specific to individual n (Eq. (22)). The probability of choosing workplace
location j is then:
P2n (j) = exp(
V Wn (j; ) −CWRn (j, i) + Sn (j)
µ2n
)
∑
j′∈I exp(V Wn (j′) −CWRn (j′, i) + Sn (j′)µ2n )
, ∀ j ∈ I. (26)
In the case of workplace choice conditional on residential location, the surplus
in Eq. (15), which is the expected utility resulting from the choice of the best
workplace conditional on residential location i, is denoted by LSn (i), and
equal to:
LSn (i) = µ2n ln(∑
j∈I exp(V Wn (j) −CWRn (j, i) + Sn (j)µ2n )) . (27)
It measures the accessibility of residential location i to employments.
4.3 Highest level: residential location
In the highest level of the decision tree, the individual anticipates the choices
of workplace, type of employment, and specific employment when she chooses
her residential location. The utility of living in residential location i (Eq.
(17)) is:
URn (i) = V Rn (i;Xn, Zi) + ε3n (i) , ∀ i ∈ I. (28)
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The residual term ε3n (i) accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity prefer-
ence of individual n for residential location i. It expresses unobserved loca-
tion characteristics, variation in individual tastes, and model misspecification.
Similarly to other levels, this residual term is distributed so that the random
part of max(j,k,l)UTn (l, k) + UWn (j) − CWRn (j, i) + ε3n (i) is type I extreme value
distributed with scale parameter µ3n. The probability of choosing residential
location i is then:
P3n (j) = exp(
V Rn (i;Xn, Zi) +LSn (i)
µ3
)
∑
i′∈I exp(V Rn (i′;Xn, Zi′) +LSn (i′)µ3 )
, ∀ i ∈ I. (29)
4.4 Method
The nested logit is estimated sequentially by backward induction: the first
model corresponds to the choice of type of employment, the second to the
choice of workplace, and the third to the choice of residential location. A
multinomial logit (MNL) model is estimated at each level, including a log-
sum variable at the intermediate and highest levels.
The difficulty of the large number of alternatives (950 pseudo-communes)
is overcome by using random sampling, which consists in randomly selecting
a small number of alternatives for each individual, with equal probabilities of
selection in the choice set. McFadden (1978) showed that random sampling
leads to consistent estimates of the coefficients of a MNL model under the
IIA assumption. Ben-Akiva et al. (1985) showed that importance sampling,
consisting in increasing the probability that a given alternative is included in
the choice set improves the efficiency of estimates, and usually induces a bias
in the coefficients, which is to be corrected. In our case, the probability that
a pseudo-commune is included in the choice set is proportional to the total
number of dwellings (highest level) or of employments (intermediate level) in
that pseudo-commune. In the absence of information, all dwellings of the same
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type and tenure status located in the same pseudo-commune are statistically
identical and provide the same expected utility and the same odds of being
selected by a household. Similarly, in the absence of information, all employ-
ments of the same type located in the same pseudo-commune are statistically
identical. The importance sampling of pseudo-communes considered here is
equivalent to uniform random sampling of dwellings (or employments), so the
coefficients are not biased and no correction is necessary.
The strong segmentation of the dwelling market in France implies that
prices vary across dwelling types and tenure status, so it is relevant to consider
dwelling prices specific to each of the four sub-markets. Moreover, at a given
point in the life cycle, a given household is usually not flexible concerning
dwelling type and tenure status. This adds a level at the top of the tree (Figure
4). Residential location is estimated separately in the four sub-samples defined
by dwelling type and tenure status, which amounts to assuming that dwelling
type and tenure status is exogenous to the choice of residential location.
[Insert Figure 4]
The choice of residential location is restricted to one-worker households,
in order to avoid the bargaining considerations that would arise in a multiple-
worker household. In such households, the employments of the different work-
ers are usually located in different places, and each household member has to
bargain so that the household finds a residence closer to his/her employment.
5 Results
5.1 Choice of type of employment
Twenty-four multinomial logit (MNL) models are estimated for the choice
between type of employments: blue collar, employee, intermediate, manager,
and independent. Given the small number of alternatives (5 employment
types), no random sampling is necessary at this level.
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Table 3 shows the results of the MNL model of employment type. Almost
all estimated coefficients by type of employment are significant. The measure
of goodness of fit presented in the last column of Table 3 shows that the ex-
planatory power increases with men’s education. Less educated men accept
any employment and are randomly assigned to employment types such as blue
collar, employee, or independent. By contrast, the most educated men accept
only employment types best suited to them (manager, intermediate, and in-
dependent). For women, depending on age and fertility, the most influential
factor in deciding whether or not to work for a woman is education, rather
than the choice of employment type.
[Insert Table 3]
The log-sum corresponds to the sum of the log-number of employments
by type, weighted by the individual-specific probability to choose a particu-
lar type of employment. This individual-specific measure of attractiveness,
defined in Eq. (24), varies between employment locations and between in-
dividual characteristics. The attractiveness of the employment type of each
workplace, computed as the log-sum across local employment types, is repre-
sented in Figures 5, 6, and 7 by sex and education.
[Insert Figures 5, 6, and 7]
5.2 Choice of workplace location
The only criteria involved in choosing a workplace location considered here are
the generalized commuting cost CWRn (j, i) and the availability of employments
of different types found in the inclusive value or surplus term Sn (j). Waddell
(1993) included average wage by employment type as an explanatory variable
of workplace location choice. Any significant difference in wages between lo-
cations in our geographical units is already in the employment type surplus
term Sn (j), because this term allows us to account for differences in the em-
ployment structure between different workplace locations. With the purpose
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of constructing a parsimonious workplace choice model, the V Wn (j;Xn, Zj)
term is considered nil.
The workplace location choice of a pseudo-commune is considered to de-
pend on its attractiveness of employment type (the individual-specific measure
computed in the employment type choice model) and the commuting travel
time of individuals. The results of the 24 workplace location choice models
are presented in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4]
In the column labeled “attractiveness” of Table 4, the estimated coefficients
indicate that the more educated and older men are more attracted by the types
of employment than younger and less educated. Women are less attracted than
men to the types of employment.
Columns labeled “travel time” and “(travel time)2” suggest that the utility
of workplace location decreases and is concave in travel time for each of the 24
groups. The value of time then depends on age, education, sex, and children.
We estimated the 24 workplace location choice models using the log num-
ber of employments. The last column of Table 4 presents the difference be-
tween the likelihood ratio (LR) of the workplace location choice model esti-
mated with the attractiveness measure and the LR of the models estimated
with the size measure. The measure of attractiveness (specific to each individ-
ual) is a better predictor of the workplace location choice than the commonly
used log total number of employments.
The log-sum of workplace locations is an appropriate accessibility mea-
sure specific to each individual which is also the expected maximum utility
of all employment opportunities. This measure varies with residence and in-
dividual characteristics. Accessibility differs across groups because the local
employment prospects and the value of time differ across them. The measure
of accessibility to employments is mapped in Figures 8 and 10 by sex and
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education. The higher an individual is educated, the wider are the differences
in accessibility (Figure 10).
[Insert Figures 8 and 10]
5.3 Choice of residential location
Tables 6 and 7 concern households with only one worker. In households with
more than one worker, negotiation among spouses modifies the choice of res-
idential location and workplace. The location model is estimated separately
by tenure type (owner and tenant) and dwelling type (apartment and single
dwelling). Sample sizes by tenure and dwelling type are presented in Table 5.
[Insert Table 5]
The last rows of Tables 6 and 7 present the goodness of fit, which is higher
for owners than for renters. This is consistent with the fact that purchasing
decisions are less random than renting decisions. The goodness of fit is higher
for the choice of single dwellings than for the choice of apartments, which is
consistent with the housing turnover rates, higher for renters than for owners,
and higher for apartments than for single dwellings. Location decisions are
more thoughtful for the longer term.
[Insert Table 6]
Owners are more sensitive to accessibility than tenants; households living
in apartments are more sensitive to accessibility than those living in a single
dwelling. These results are consistent with considerations of life cycle and
geographical distribution of single dwellings and apartments. In early stages
of the life cycle, when households have no children yet, they usually rent an
apartment located in relation to potential employments. At later stages of the
life cycle, households buy single dwellings far away in the suburbs. Subways
and suburban train stations attract only households who rent apartments.
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Table 6 shows that for households with an average income, the price has a
negative effect on the probability of location, with the exception of households
renting a single dwelling (small sample). The negative effect of price decreases
with income, and may be positive for the richest households.
Net all other effects, people in the outer ring prefer a single dwelling to an
apartment. Apartments located in a now town are preferred. Single dwellings
are chosen with the same preference in planned cities or in other locations (net
all other effects). The effect of the residence tax for ownership and tenancy
and property taxes for ownership is ambiguous. Higher taxes have a direct
negative effect, but they are usually associated with local services such as
child care center or streets amenities, not measured here.
[Insert Table 7]
In Table 7, as expected, households living in an apartment are more likely
to move to a dense area, and those living in a single dwelling are less likely to
do so. Similarly, households renting are more likely to move to a dense area,
and those living in their own dwelling are less likely to do so. Households join
households with similar age, size, and income. Single dwelling owners are more
attracted by communes with a high percentage of foreigners, because (rich)
foreigners who settle in the Paris region tend to buy dwellings close to their
compatriots. Beyond a certain threshold, the percentage of (poorer) foreigners
can be deterrent, but the concerned communes include few dwelling-owners.
Renters are attracted by the percentage of foreigners but this decreases with
education.
6 Conclusion
Micro-simulation models of urban land use ignore the association of residential
location, workplace, and decision for employment type. Urban models of gen-
eral equilibrium consider only limited heterogeneity. Heterogeneity may affect
several aspects of urban models such as travel behavior (see Xin et al. (2013) in
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this issue and Coulombel et al. (2013) in a companion issue. In other to breach
this gap, a three-level nested logit model for the choices of residential location,
workplace, and type of employment allowed us to compute individual-specific
measures of accessibility to employments, value of time, and attractiveness to
the type of employments. We took into account the individual-specific attrac-
tiveness to the type of employments and the heterogeneity of preferences with
respect to education, age, sex, and fertility.
The measure of attractiveness to type of employments is a better predictor
of workplace than the usual measure of total number of employments. Workers
are not attracted indifferently by any employment, but by the employments
which are better suited to them. This is stronger for highly educated men.
Individual-specific accessibility determines the choice of residential location
choice, and its effects vary along the life cycle.
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Table 1. Examples of chosen alternatives under the full information and learn-
ing cases
Expected utility Realization Utility
Choice set Alternative Vi ei Ui Chosen alternative
1 1 0 2 2 under full information
1 2 0 1 1
2 3 1 0 1 in the learning case
2 4 1 -1 0
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Table 2. Sample size per category
Men Women
Under 35 35 and over Under 35 35 and over
With Without With Without
Education children children children children
Elementary 18,270 36,813 5,002 7,700 5,974 25,577
Secondary 8,551 12,750 2,950 5,883 3,402 11,251
Undergraduate 10,441 10,234 3,354 9,569 3,145 7,791
Graduate 11,091 17,279 2,478 8,549 3,165 8,280
Note: Total sample size of 239,499 working people. Categorization by sex, age, children, and
education resulted in 24 sub-samples. A woman is categorized as having children if she has
at least one child of 11 years old or less. Source: general population census for Île-de-France.
Insee, 1999.
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Table 3. Choice of type of employment
Employment type preferences (reference: blue collar)
Groups lnNjk Independent Managerial Intermediate Employee LRI†
Men
Under 35
Elementary 0.82∗∗ -1.53∗∗ -3.25∗∗ -1.71∗∗ -1.36∗∗ 0.30
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Secondary 0.86∗∗ -0.94∗∗ -1.70∗∗ -0.39∗∗ -0.36∗∗ 0.16
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Undergraduate 0.96∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 1.26∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.21
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Graduate 0.83∗∗ 0.91∗∗ 2.96∗∗ 1.59∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.44
(0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
35 and over
Elementary 0.81∗∗ -0.33∗∗ -1.95∗∗ -1.01∗∗ -1.33∗∗ 0.13
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Secondary 0.80∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.46∗∗ -0.35∗∗ 0.07
(0.03) (0.048) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Undergraduate 0.74∗∗ 1.20∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 1.30∗∗ -0.30∗∗ 0.19
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Graduate 0.60∗∗ 1.88∗∗ 3.17∗∗ 1.05∗∗ -0.31∗∗ 0.50
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Women
Under 35
With children
Elementary 0.84∗∗ -0.66∗∗ -2.51∗∗ -0.50∗∗ 1.33∗∗ 0.47
(0.06) (0.12) (0.14) (0.06) (0.05)
Secondary 0.77∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.62∗∗ 1.26∗∗ 2.12∗∗ 0.40
(0.10) (0.19) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10)
Undergraduate 0.87∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 1.51∗∗ 3.16∗∗ 2.62∗∗ 0.37
(0.09) (0.24) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Graduate 0.96∗∗ 1.33∗∗ 4.12∗∗ 3.40∗∗ 1.99∗∗ 0.42
(0.09) (0.34) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Without children
Elementary 0.85∗∗ -0.63∗∗ -2.08∗∗ -0.40∗∗ 1.33∗∗ 0.45
(0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04)
Secondary 0.73∗∗ -0.52∗∗ -0.41∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 2.11∗∗ 0.41
(0.07) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Undergraduate 0.75∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 1.17∗∗ 2.92∗∗ 2.76∗∗ 0.37
(0.06) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Graduate 0.82∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 3.67∗∗ 3.24∗∗ 2.38∗∗ 0.34
(0.05) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
35 and over
With children
Elementary 0.74∗∗ -0.54∗∗ -1.82∗∗ -0.37∗∗ 1.28∗∗ 0.40
(0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Secondary 0.78∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 1.90∗∗ 2.21∗∗ 0.30
(0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Undergraduate 1.14∗∗ 1.67∗∗ 1.92∗∗ 3.07∗∗ 1.83∗∗ 0.34
(0.09) (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Graduate 0.62∗∗ 1.66∗∗ 4.15∗∗ 3.01∗∗ 1.64∗∗ 0.45
(0.08) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
Without children
Elementary 0.86∗∗ 0.13∗∗ -1.15∗∗ -0.12∗∗ 1.20∗∗ 0.32
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Secondary 0.82∗∗ 1.34∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 2.21∗∗ 2.15∗∗ 0.24
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Undergraduate 0.88∗∗ 1.60∗∗ 2.26∗∗ 3.06∗∗ 1.88∗∗ 0.29
(0.05) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Graduate 0.38∗∗ 1.62∗∗ 4.13∗∗ 2.97∗∗ 1.91∗∗ 0.41
(0.05) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
† Likelihood ratio index. ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level, ∗ significant at the 10% level. Standard
deviations in parentheses.
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Table 4. Choice of workplace location
Explanatory variables
Groups Attractiveness Travel time (Travel time)2 LRI† ∆LR††
Men
Under 35
Elementary -0.05∗∗ 1.25∗∗ -8.42∗∗ 0.48 -7.0
(0.01) (0.12) (0.19)
Secondary 0.06∗∗ 1.71∗∗ -8.37∗∗ 0.38 -1.0
(0.01) (0.16) (0.24)
Undergraduate 0.05∗∗ 1.42∗∗ -7.07∗∗ 0.28 6.0
(0.01) (0.14) (0.20)
Graduate 0.13∗∗ 1.26∗∗ -5.89∗∗ 0.21 114.6
(0.01) (0.12) (0.17)
35 and over
Elementary 0.04∗∗ 1.78∗∗ -8.76∗∗ 0.43 1.0
(0.01) (0.08) (0.12)
Secondary 0.21∗∗ 1.91∗∗ -8.39∗∗ 0.33 -6.0
(0.01) (0.13) (0.19)
Undergraduate 0.15∗∗ 1.88∗∗ -7.79∗∗ 0.29 25.0
(0.01) (0.13) (0.20)
Graduate 0.29∗∗ 1.69∗∗ -7.11∗∗ 0.25 272.0
(0.01) (0.11) (0.15)
Women
Under 35
With children
Elementary 0.04∗ 0.54∗∗ -7.97∗∗ 0.53 -2.0
(0.02) (0.24) (0.39)
Secondary 0.20∗∗ -0.22 -6.27∗∗ 0.42 0.1
(0.03) (0.29) (0.46)
Undergraduate 0.16∗∗ -0.48∗ -5.80∗∗ 0.39 6.8
(0.02) (0.28) (0.43)
Graduate 0.11∗∗ -0.35 -4.91∗∗ 0.30 13.9
(0.02) (0.30) (0.44)
Without children
Elementary 0.06∗∗ 0.51∗∗ -7.84∗∗ 0.51 -4.0
(0.02) (0.20) (0.30)
Secondary 0.23∗∗ 0.21 -6.80∗∗ 0.42 -1.0
(0.02) (0.21) (0.32)
Undergraduate 0.24∗∗ 0.34∗∗ -6.02∗∗ 0.32 25.0
(0.01) (0.15) (0.22)
Graduate 0.11∗∗ 0.50∗∗ -5.34∗∗ 0.25 45.1
(0.01) (0.15) (0.21)
35 and over
With children
Elementary 0.17∗∗ 0.58∗∗ -8.14∗∗ 0.54 -7.0
(0.02) (0.22) (0.36)
Secondary 0.30∗∗ -0.07 -6.97∗∗ 0.46 2.5
(0.03) (0.29) (0.45)
Undergraduate 0.19∗∗ 0.21 -6.92∗∗ 0.42 13.3
(0.02) (0.28) (0.42)
Graduate 0.20∗∗ -0.42 -5.37∗∗ 0.35 20.2
(0.03) (0.28) (0.40)
Without children
Elementary 0.15∗∗ 0.69∗∗ -8.27∗∗ 0.55 -28.0
(0.01) (0.11) (0.17)
Secondary 0.30∗∗ 0.35∗∗ -7.30∗∗ 0.45 23.0
(0.01) (0.16) (0.24)
Undergraduate 0.16∗∗ 0.60∗∗ -7.15∗∗ 0.41 20.0
(0.01) (0.17) (0.26)
Graduate 0.17∗∗ 0.68∗∗ -6.66∗∗ 0.36 22.0
(0.03) (0.17) (0.24)
†Likelihood ratio index. ††∆LR is the difference between the likelihood ratio (LR) of the model of
workplace location estimated with the attractiveness measure and the LR of the model estimated with
the size measure (total number of jobs). ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level, ∗ significant at the 10% level.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5. Sample size by tenure and dwelling type
Dwelling type1
Tenure Apartment Single dwelling Total
Owner 17,047 16,121 33,168
(37.96%)
Tenant 51,104 3,095 54,199
(62.04%)
Total 68,151 19,216 87,367
(78.01%) (21.99%) (100%)
1All the detached-single unit and semi-detached dwellings are de-
fined as “houses,” otherwise the dwellings are defined as “flats”.
Sample size of 87,367 one-worker households living and working
in Île-de-France.
Source: general population census for Île-de-France. Insee, 1999.
37
Table 6. Choice of residential location (I)
Owner Tenant
Apartment Single Apartment Single
dwelling dwelling
Accessibility and transport
Accessibility to employments (IV) 0.30∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.08)
Suburban train × high-income 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Suburban train× middle-income 0.001 -0.06∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02)
Suburban train× low-income -0.01 -0.03 0.02 ∗∗ -0.07∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.004) (0.02)
Subway × high-income 0.005 -0.06∗∗ 0.03∗∗ -0.06∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.01)
Subway× middle-income 0.005 -0.09∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.003) (0.01) (0.001) (0.01)
Subway × low-income -0.001∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.0001 -0.04∗∗
(0.004) (0.01) (0.001) (0.01)
Prices
Average price × high-income 1.21∗∗ -0.09 -1.39∗∗ 2.18∗∗
(0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.51)
Average price × middle-income -0.47∗∗ -0.20 -2.44∗∗ 0.89∗
(0.19) (0.15) (0.13) (0.48)
Average price × low-income -0.87∗∗ -0.62∗∗ -3.42∗∗ 0.96∗
(0.21) (0.26) (0.13) (0.52)
Regional dummies
Resides in Paris -0.50∗∗ -1.03∗∗
(0.06) (0.04)
Resides in the outer ring -0.10∗∗ -0.04 -0.43∗∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07)
Resides in a new town 0.39∗∗ -0.04 0.06∗∗ 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08)
Local tax rates
Residence tax × high-income 0.04∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.002
(0.01) (0.004) (0.003) (0.01)
Residence tax × middle-income 0.05∗∗ -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.01)
Residence tax × low-income 0.06∗∗ -0.01 0.01∗∗ 0.0007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Ownership tax × high-income -0.04∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Ownership tax× middle-income -0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Ownership tax × low-income -0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 17,047 16,121 51,104 3,095
Likelihood ratio index (LRI) 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.16
∗∗ Significant at the 5% level, ∗ significant at the 10% level. Standard deviations in
parentheses.
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Table 7. Choice of residential location (II)
Owner Tenant
Apartment Single Apartment Single
dwelling dwelling
Land use and local amenities
Density 0.01∗∗ -0.07∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.07∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% noise (surface) 0.19 -0.34∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.57∗∗
(0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.26)
% water (surface under) 0.10 -2.44∗∗ 0.99∗∗ -0.61
(0.30) (0.35) (0.17) (0.77)
% water × children dummy 0.38 1.11 0.08 2.54∗∗
(0.80) (0.72) (0.37) (1.30)
% priority schools (surface) -0.06 -0.12∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 0.15
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
% priority schools × children dummy 0.25∗∗ -0.13∗ 0.45∗∗ -0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.15)
% educational buildings (surface) 0.52 -11.14∗∗ 0.62∗∗ -5.97∗∗
(0.51) (1.16) (0.31) (2.14)
% education × children dummy -0.07 -0.30 3.40∗∗ -8.03∗∗
(1.51) (1.69) (0.63) (3.21)
Neighborhood composition
% foreign HHs 8.30∗∗ 8.52∗∗ 5.23∗∗ 6.59∗∗
(0.58) (0.54) (0.23) (0.97)
% foreign HHs × below secondary 3.88∗∗ 0.60 3.00∗∗ 1.74
(0.60) (0.50) (0.28) (1.13)
% foreign HHs × undergraduate 0.22 -0.40 0.19 -1.44
(0.42) (0.42) (0.22) (0.93)
% foreign HHs × graduate -1.21∗∗ -1.39∗∗ -1.73∗∗ -2.1∗∗
(0.42) (0.47) (0.24) (1.06)
% high-income HHs × high-income 1.31∗∗ 2.68∗∗ -0.07 1.39∗∗
(0.25) (0.19) (0.17) (0.47)
% low-income HHs × low-income -0.90∗∗ -0.60 0.38∗∗ 0.81
(0.43) (0.55) (0.19) (0.83)
% middle-income HHs × middle-income -1.53∗∗ 2.89∗∗ 1.60∗∗ 0.73
(0.63) (0.41) (0.30) (0.81)
% of 1person HHs × 1 person HH 4.20∗∗ -1.17∗∗ 4.27∗∗ 0.92
(0.18) (0.39) (0.10) (0.57)
% of 2 persons HHs × 2 people HH -1.31 2.12∗∗ -0.17 -1.29
(0.83) (0.68) (0.47) (1.52)
% of 3+ persons HHs × 3+ people HH 0.19 3.39∗∗ 1.23∗∗ 2.91∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.11) (0.43)
% young HHs × young HH 2.41∗∗ -3.76∗∗ 4.25∗∗ -1.09
(0.51) (0.84) (0.23) (0.96)
% middle-age HHs × middle-age HH -0.62∗∗ 1.75∗∗ -0.28∗ -0.29
(0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.49)
% old HHs × old HH 3.65∗∗ 2.30∗∗ 1.55∗∗ 1.54∗
(0.37) (0.31) (0.29) (0.91)
Observations 17,047 16,121 51,104 3,095
Likelihood ratio index (LRI) 0.0598 0.2166 0.0553 0.1639
Note: HH= Household Head. ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level, ∗ significant at the 10% level.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Three-level nested structure of the choice of residential location,
workplace, and type of employment
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Figure 2. Île-de-France (1,300 communes)
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Figure 3. Communes by total number of employments (950 grouped com-
munes with more than 100 employments)
42
Figure 4. Three-level nested structure of the choice of residential location,
workplace, and type of employment; segmentation by tenure and dwelling
type
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Figure 5. Attractiveness of communes for workers by sex
44
Figure 6. Attractiveness of communes for workers by level of education (I)
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Figure 7. Attractiveness of communes for workers by level of education (II)
46
Figure 8. Accessibility to employments by sex
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Figure 9. Accessibility to employments by level of education (I)
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Figure 10. Accessibility to employments by level of education (II)
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